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Abstract 
Network externality, which affects the value of many high-tech and Internet-related products, may 
have a critical impact on firm strategies. This paper focuses on the strategy selection of various 
players in a channel structure. We design a sequential game among two suppliers and a retailer. In 
the developed game and model, we provide two optional strategies to the retailer, whereas suppliers 
can impact retailer strategies with their own pricing. We found that (direct) network externality 
typically had a positive effect on firms. More important, we conclude that when the degree of product 
network externality from a weak supplier reaches a certain scale, a relatively stable state of 
competition is facilitated, which is more profitable compared with a collusion strategy. Otherwise, the 
two suppliers can still maintain a competition relationship. However, a collusion strategy may be 
more profitable than competition in the second case. In this article, we recommend an acquisition 
strategy as a sustainable and reasonable collusion strategy. 
Keywords: digital products, price strategy, network externality, competition, collusion. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Retailers (e.g., Amazon, Jingdong, Walmart, and GameStop) sell similar products by various brands. 
Different suppliers offer these products (e.g., iPhone 5s and Samsung Galaxy S6). Certain digital and 
information products such as cellphones, online games, and music-sharing programs have network 
externality. In other words, consumer utility depends on both the product itself and the number of 
consumers who have joined the corresponding network (Katz and Shapiro 1985). Network externality 
is widespread and exists for various information sources and digital products (Tomak and Keskin 
2008). 
We investigate pricing and interaction strategies between retailers and suppliers for network 
externality. Previous related studies have focused on the product version of supplier products (Jing 
2007), consumer behavior (Gupta and Mela 2008, Li et al. 2014), managers aggressiveness (Hahn et al. 
2015), and sales channel selection problems (Liu et al. 2015) in network externality. Pricing problems 
have also been researched (Bensaid and Lesne 1996, Cabral et al. 1999). However, previous studies 
have rarely focused on retailer interactions with suppliers and interactions among suppliers. 
Specifically, the following topics must be investigated: how suppliers should manager the retailer 
creation of pricing plans; how suppliers affect one another; and whether suppliers should engage in 
collaboration. For example, Amazon sells many products of the same type, such as Apple and 
Samsung phones, Nikon and Canon SLR cameras, and Dell and Samsung ultrabooks. Different 
suppliers provide these goods. We investigate the pricing and competitive strategies of retailers and 
suppliers for goods similar to these products to reach an understanding of the overall market in the 
context of network externality. In addition, we aim to explain various merger phenomena. 
We modeled two suppliers and one retailer in the market. The two suppliers offer two products with 
network externality. The two suppliers, with a potential asymmetric demand, supply products to the 
retailer in a local marketplace. The reservation price of consumer included intrinsic valuation and 
direct network externality. Using this model and a game-theoretic model, we find that network 
externality has a positive effect on product retail and wholesale prices; the impact is similar on retailer 
and supplier profit. We still consider a possibility that the supplier with an appealing wholesale price 
can gain retailer favour through pricing. Surprisingly, we discover that when the weaker supplier has 
an unfavorable network externality degree, a collusion strategy, which is superior to a competitive 
strategy, may enhance profits for each supplier. However, if the weaker supplier has a sufficient 
network externality degree, maintaining a competitive state with the stronger supplier may be more 
advantageous. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the literature review; Section 
3 presents our applied model; Section 4 details our analysis and the results; and finally, Section 5 
offers a conclusion. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previous studies have primarily investigated the “two-tier” customer-supplier market structure for 
pricing and product strategies; few studies have examined competition or cooperation strategies 
among suppliers. For example, Baake and Boom (2001) revealed that when a vertical differentiation 
product has the characteristics of network externality, the quality difference of the products not only 
alleviates price competition between manufacturers but also facilitates improved compatibility for the 
manufacturer’s creation of products. Bayer and Chan (2007) found an inverse relationship between 
product pricing and the past size of a product. In other words, a greater past product scale led to a 
lower market pricing for the product. Kim (2000) indicated that when the product has network 
externality, manufacturers achieve greater technological innovation. In this case, they prefer the 
incompatible strategy, and are more willing to reveal their technology content to the market. 
Otherwise, the manufacturer with the lower innovation ability would prefer a full compatibility 
strategy, which facilitates further gains. 
Numerous studies have also examined network externality in the competition and standardization 
process (Katz and Shapiro 1985, Heinrich 2014), implications of licensing (Economides 1996), 
dynamic pricing and inventory management (Yang and Zhang 2015), preannouncement behavior 
(Farrell and Saloner 1986), bundling sales (Gallaugher and Wang 2002, Ghosh and Balachander 2007, 
Prasad et al. 2010), and user loyalty (Li et al. 2014). 
3 MODEL SETUP 
We assume that two suppliers and a retailer exist in the market. Supplier i  provides product i ( i   1 
or 2). Products 1 and 2 are imperfect substitutes for each other. The wholesale price is denoted as 
1w  
and
2w , whereas the marginal cost of each product is assumed to be 0. The retailer, which is a 
monopolist, decides the products’ retail prices, 
1P  and 2P ; the suppliers as well as the retailer are 
profit-maximizing firms. Without loss of generality, the total market potential was normalized to 1 in 
this study. 
In this study, purchasing decisions of consumers are based on maximizing consumer surplus. We 
assume that every consumer has only one unit demand. Without loss of generality, we assume that the 
mass of the consumer is one unit in the market. Each consumer offers a particular reservation price for 
a product in the market. According to Prasad et al. (2010), the two parts of product value are called 
intrinsic valuation and direct network externality. Therefore, with network externality, a reservation 
price is expressed as the sum of these two parts. 
The intrinsic valuation of a product is referred to as the value to a particular consumer in the absence 
of any network. Let 
ikR denote the intrinsic valuation of product i  for consumer k . We assume that 
(
1kR , 1kR ) is uniformly distributed on [0,1]  [0,1], and that 1kR  and 1kR  are independent of each other 
(Nalebuff 2004, Prasad et al. 2010). We use this approach to represent consumer heterogeneity. We 
use 
iR  to replace ikR  because the mass of the consumer is one unit. We represents direct network 
externality utility that consumers gain from product i  as 
i in D  (Padmanabhan et al. 1997, Economides 
2000, Prasad et al. 2010). Parameter 
in  represents the size of network externality for product i . 
Endogenous variable 
iD  is the market demand for product i . We thus assume that prospective 
consumers know the equilibrium demand of the market. 
Consumer reservation price 
iRP  for product i  is given by i i i iRP R n D  . Thus, iRP  with constraint 
1i i i i in D RP n D   . The net utility gained by consumers from product i  is given by 
 
i .i i i i i iV RP P R n D P       (1) 
Let
1 2 0V V  ; we can then derive this as 
 
2 1 1 2 ,R R m m     (2) 
where
i i i im n D P  . In Inequality (2), the consumer is bound to choose product 1, because the 
consumer can obtain a higher utility from product 1 than from product 2. As shown in Figure 1, the 
gray area is consistent with the representation of 
1D  in Inequality (2); the remaining area is 2D . The 
total market potential is one, and therefore, 
 
1 2 1.D D    (3) 
Assumption 1  
1 2 .0 1m m    
Without loss of generality, here we suppose that
1 2 10 m m   . If we assume that 1 21 0m m    , 
this is the equivalent of switching the two products or suppliers, which does not affect the generality of 
the conclusion of our study. In addition, when 
1 2 1m m   or 1 2 1m m   , it is implied that 1 1D   
and 
2 0D   or 1 0D   and 2 1D  , which is an unfavorable scenario. Therefore, this study investigates 
only the case of
1 2 10 m m   , as shown in Figure 1. Consequently, the ordinate intercept of 
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  (4) 
Lemma 1  
21 1 2, 1 2.D D   
After considering Eq. (3) and Figure 1, 
2 11 2, 1 2D D  can be determined. This study is based on 
this premise, on which we can consider that the two suppliers are asymmetric. Because 1 2D D , we 
can suggest that supplier 1 achieves a market advantage over supplier 2. In practice, most suppliers in 
a specific market are often asymmetrical, such as Apple and Samsung, China Mobile and China 
Unicom, and Twitter and Facebook. Therefore, we believe that such a premise may receive further 
attention in the future. 
 
Figure 1. Consumer’s demand on the two products. 
In this study, the retailer and two suppliers play a timing game. An initial state before the game 
includes 
in  and iw  ( i  1 or 2). According to this initial state, the retailer determines an optimal 
pricing. Therefore, with this strategy, the market has product demands 
1D  and 2D  . According to the 
retailer’s pricing strategy, the suppliers are likely to adopt various alternative strategies. It should be 
emphasized that the interaction arises not only between the two suppliers and the retailer but also 
between suppliers 1 and 2. 
For the retailer, the purpose is to maximize profit 
1 2( , )R P P  
as
1 2
1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
,
max ( , ) ( ) ( )R
P P
P P P w D P w D     . And for supplier i , the purpose is to maximize 
profit ( )i iw , shown as max ( )
i
i i i i
w
w w D  . Then the following conclusions can be obtained. Unless 
indicated otherwise, all proofs of this paper are omitted due to the page limit but available from 
authors upon request. 
 
Lemma 2  The retailer has two alternative strategies, 
1s  and 2s , where 
1 1 1 2s { , 1}P n P   ;  12 21 2s 1,2 12P Pn n     . When the retailer chooses strategy 1s , the 
corresponding market demand is 
1 21, 0D D   and the profit is  
1
1 1 1,1R n n w    , whereas when 
the retailer chooses strategy
2s , the corresponding product demand is 2 11 2, 1 2D D  and the profit 
is  2 1 2 12 21 1, 12 2 ) 4 ) 21 ( (R n n wn n w         . 
Lemma 3  Supplier 2 wants the retailer to choose policy
2s . 
We can find with 
1w  and 2w , the profit of the retailer increases (weakly) with 1n  and 2n . Therefore, a 
retailer can benefit further from the increase in the size of network externality, but without incurring 
the excessive additional cost of price-pushing. By Lemma 2 and 3, we can also find that supplier 2 
benefits from a larger 
2n  and a small 2w , which is in line with 2s . 
4 ANALYSIS 
We first identify the factors that affect the retailer and supplier’s choice of strategy. Next, we 
investigate another strategy for the two suppliers. The results are presented in the following. 
Proposition 1  When 
1 2 1 23 4 2 2n n w w     is satisfied, the retailer chooses policy 2s ; otherwise, 




R R  , and 1 2 1 23 4 2 2n n w w    . Obviously, we can find that a larger in  and a small iw  are 
supportive to policy
is . From the demands of products in Lemma 2, we can suggest that policy 
is actually implies the retailer’s preference to products. Retailer benefit more from a larger in  and a 
small 
iw  if condition of is  is satisfied. Particularly, under 1 2 1 23 4 2 2n n w w    , if possible, the 
retailer even want to choose
2 11, 0D D  . However, because of Lemma 1, the rational retailer must 
choose a maximum possible output for product 2, namely
2 1 2D  . 1D  can only take a minimum of 
1 2 . Under the existing conditions, supplier 2 has a price advantage over supplier 1. This creates an 
incentive when the retailer sells product 2, and supplier 2 is well equipped to divide the market 
demand evenly with supplier 1, even if they are asymmetric. Overall, this appears reasonable. 
We present a discussion on the suppliers’ pricing. Because of certain constraints involving market 
factors such as rivals, consumer endurance or sensitivity to price, and government intervention, to 
ensure the possibility of a sale, both 
1w  and 2w  should follow an upper bound, denoted as 1 0   and 
2 0  . In other words, the wholesale price cannot be excessively high, even when the firm is a 
monopolist. Our result regarding 
2 1 1 23 2 2 2w w n n     is achieved afterward, which is an 
indifference curve of 
1w and 2w for the retailer, derived from the condition in Proposition 2. For 
simplicity, we assume that 
1 23 2 2 2nt n    in the result. Let t  denote the network externality 
effect, and 
1 2w tw  denote the wholesale price effect. The result is as follows. 
Proposition 2  If 
1 23 2 2 2 0n n     (i.e., 0t  ), the retailer selects 2s , after which 1 1w   and 
 when 
2 t   , then 2 2w  ; 
 when 
1 2 t   , then 2 1w t  ; 
 when 
1 2 0t    , then 2 2w  ; 
Intuitively, 0t  suggests that 
2n  has reached a certain level, and that the network externality effect 
benefits supplier 2. In other words, 
2n is sufficiently high to facilitate a retailer choice of 2s . Because 
supplier 2 has a substantially stronger motivation to urge the retailer to choose
2s , a rational supplier 1 
does not compete with supplier 2 in a price war. Because supplier 1 has a demand advantage, it can 
always set the highest and optimal price. This is similar to the case of Apple’s market advantage with 
the iPhone. However, for a supplier with a weaker demand such as supplier 2, the case is complex. 
When 
2  is extremely low ( 2 1 23 2 2 2n n     ) or the wholesale price effect regarding i is 
positive (
1 2 0t    ), supplier 2 can set the highest price. Conversely, when the wholesale price 
effect regarding 
i is negative ( 1 2 0t    ), supplier 2 cannot set the highest price because 2 is too 
high; thus, the network externality effect (negative) is not strong. We found that a collusion strategy 
cannot be reached when 0t  . In other words, if the network externality effect favors the weaker 
supplier, competition is more effective compared with collusion and the two suppliers only have the 
motivation to maintain
2s . 
Proposition 3  If 
1 23 2 2 2 0n n     (i.e., 0t  ), 
 when 
1 2t  , the retailer selects 1s , and 1 1w  ; 
 when 
1 2t   and 2 10 t    , the retailer selects 2s  and  1 1 2 2,w w   , or the suppliers 
adopt a collusion strategy as  1 2 2 2,w t w     to have the retailer select 1s ; 
 when 
1 2t  and 2 1 t   , the retailer selects 2s , and  1 1 2 1,w w t    or the suppliers 
employ the collusion strategy of  1 1 2 1,w w t     to influence the retailer to select 1s . 
Intuitively, 0t  suggests that 
2n  cannot reach a level at which 0t  , whereby 2s is unstable. The 
network externality effect benefits supplier 1. When 
1w  cannot be priced too high (i.e., 1 2t  ), such 
as in a price war, supplier 2 may be forced out of the market. Consequently, supplier 1 monopolizes 
the market at the expense of profits. When
1 2t  , if the wholesale price effect of i  is positive (i.e., 
1 2 0t    ), the difference in tradeoff advantages between the two suppliers is minor. Therefore, 
the retailer prefers s2, and the suppliers employ the highest price strategy. However, if the wholesale 
price effect of 
i  is negative (i.e., 1 2 0t    ), the tradeoff favors supplier 1, which can set the 
highest price, whereas supplier 2 cannot. When
1 2t  , if supplier 1 colludes with supplier 2 and 
employs a low-price strategy, each supplier may generate further profits. If the overall power disparity 
is strong between the two firms, an acquisition strategy is more profitable than is competition. In 
summary, for the collusion strategy, the two suppliers only have the motivation to maintain
1s . We also 
found that 
2s  does not have to exist with 0t  . 
5 CONCLUSION 
Although our study lacks empirical support, it is relevant to real-world markets for various reasons. 
First, if a positive network effect exists, a common goal among the retailer and suppliers is to attempt 
to boost the degree of that network effect. Second, for two products that are imperfect substitutes, if no 
significant difference exists in the degree of network externality, retailer sales for the two products 
revealed no significant difference, and are stable with each other. Furthermore, the suppliers also 
retain a relatively stable state of competition. We determined that a collusion strategy was inferior to a 
competitive strategy in improving the total profits for the suppliers; as in the real-world examples of 
Samsung and Apple cellphones, or Leica and Linhof cameras, the weaker firm can also gain a 
significant market share with an attractive network effect and a reasonable price. Third, if a weaker 
product such as product 2 has a lower network externality degree and an unappealing price, it has few 
advantages over a stronger product. For the weaker supplier in the market, it is rational to cooperate 
with the stronger counterpart. It is not uncommon for many small companies to desire acquisition by 
larger companies. Some examples include T-Mobile USA’s purchase of MetroPCS in 2013, Lenovo’s 
purchase of IBM PCD in 2004, and Electronic Arts’ (EA) 1991 purchase of Distinctive Software 
which once served Accolade, a main rival to EA and the 1998 purchase of Westwood. In reality, these 
acquisitions are ideal, and are similar to a collusion strategy, which may be more sustainable in an 
acquisition case than in an independent collusion case, according to our analytical results. Surprisingly, 
for a merger strategy, the weaker product can be regarded as a low-quality version, whereas the 
stronger product is regarded as a high-quality counterpart. Supplier profits rely on high-quality 
products, whereas the low-quality product version mainly improves the product network scale. This is 
relatively similar to the findings reported by Jing (2007). 
Future research may aim to empirically validate the model. An investigation into the social welfare of 
various firm strategies is also warranted. Moreover, relaxing the premise that a consumer can buy only 
one product from two choices would prove fruitful. 
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